Examines NATO's Balkan interventions over the entire decade starting with the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1992. Focusing on the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, it traces the record of early transatlantic failures and later successes as once bitterly divided allies were able, finally, to unite around some basic principles. By the time of the Kosovo intervention in spring 1999, the allies agreed on the necessity of taking sides and using military force in conflicts that were complicated, but far from morally opaque. The book concludes with some lessons around which the transatlantic allies might reasonably hope - despite other pressing concerns - to stay engaged and stay united.

A short assessment of the entire decade of NATO's Balkan interventions from 1992 until 2002. Illuminates the bitterness of transatlantic divisions and how these divisions were overcome as the allies converged around a clear set of principles by the time of the 1999 Kosovo war.